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INTRODUCTION
Since the reforms to matrimonial and testamentaryjurisdiction stripped the ecclesiastical courts ofalmost all of their business it is perhaps
understandable that few lawyers ever turn their attention
to ecclesiastical jurisdiction. The jurisdiction left to the
ecclesiastical courts generated only a small number of suits
and was concerned purely with the buildings and fabric of
churches and the conduct of church officers. The resulting
decline in the legal significance of the ecclesiastical courts
and their personnel happened at a time when the Church
of England was beginning to lose its dominant position in
the life of the nation and the machinery of the state.
Despite this, there are several compelling reasons why
lawyers, especially those with an interest in legal history,
should look to the history of the ecclesiastical courts after
1860. Firstly, in an era characterised by rapid change and
turmoil in the life of the Church of England, that
jurisdiction which remained to the ecclesiastical courts
heard suits which generated both huge public interest and
intense controversy; and which had profound
consequences for the Church as an institution and as a
religious community.
Secondly, the high profile of ecclesiastical suits, and the
controversy which surrounded them, prompted many
attempts to reform ecclesiastical jurisdiction. These
reform initiatives were themselves the subject of fierce
debate. Further, one of the main fora in which they were
agitated was Parliament, and the primary mechanism for
reform was legislation. Given this, ecclesiastical court
reform could, and did, both interact with, and influence,
the secular law reform agenda. This article examines one
instance of this: the interaction of attempts to reform
ecclesiastical appellate jurisdiction and the proposals put
forward by Lord Selborne in the Supreme Court of
Judicature Bill 1873.
A BRIEF HISTORY OF ECCLESIASTICAL
APPEALS 1830 –73
The history of nineteenth century attempts to reform
ecclesiastical appeals began with the efforts of Henry
Brougham, and with the special report of the first Royal
Commission on Ecclesiastical Courts in which he had a
pivotal role. The Royal Commission was scathing in its
assessment of the fitness of the existing court of final
ecclesiastical appeal, the High Court of Delegates. Noting
the lack of expertise of its judges, its ad hoc composition,
the numerous opportunities for appeal which led to a lack
of finality of process, and the level of expense and delay
which litigants incurred as a result, the Commission
recommended wholesale reform. Brougham’s solution
was to transfer final appellate jurisdiction in ecclesiastical
suits to the Privy Council, under the Privy Council Appeals
Act 1832, and then to the newly formulated Judicial
Committee of the Privy Council, under the Judicial
Committee Act 1833.
No special provision was made in the 1833 Act for the
staffing of the Judicial Committee when it heard
ecclesiastical appeals. As such, there was no legal
requirement that one or more bishops should be upon the
panel or present at these hearings. In this respect the
Judicial Committee contrasted strongly with the mixed
character of the High Court of Delegates, which had been
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composed of common law and Chancery judges sitting
together with civilians and bishops. However, the 1833
Act did empower the President of the Council to call non-
judicial members, including the Archbishops and senior
bishops, to attend hearings of the Judicial Committee.
This power was used to ensure that at least one bishop
attended ecclesiastical hearings, and a convention was
quickly established to this effect.
Despite consistent obedience to the convention certain
sections of the Church, particularly those in the High
Church tradition, were dissatisfied with the composition of
the Judicial Committee. In particular, they deprecated the
absence of a legal guarantee that one or more bishops
would form part of the panel. These concerns were at least
partially addressed by the Church Discipline Act 1840,
which provided that at least one bishop should sit as a
judge in any appeal brought under the Act. Yet many
continued to be dissatisfied, not least because in
ecclesiastical suits brought by procedures other than that
detailed in the 1840 Act there remained no legal guarantee
that one of the judges would be a bishop.
In the face of mounting concerns about the weakness of
the Judicial Committee’s ecclesiastical component the
High Church Bishop of London, Blomfield, introduced a
string of Bills into the House of Lords in the late 1840s and
1850. None of these Bills, which would have required the
Judicial Committee to submit all doctrinal cases to a panel
of bishops for their opinion, passed first reading in the
House of Lords. There was strong opposition to what were
seen as attempts to subjugate the authority of the court to
a panel of non-lawyers, many of whom held strong
opinions on the matters at issue. In spite of this the Lower
House of the Convocation of Canterbury, which was
dominated by High Church clergy, revived these proposals
in 1865. Once again the proposal met with failure in the
face of fierce opposition.
The High Church theme of seeking a stronger episcopal
or theological element in the composition of the final court
of ecclesiastical appeal was perpetuated in the last reform
proposals advanced before the debates provoked by the
Judicature Bill in 1873. These proposals, put forward by
a committee of the first Pan-Anglican Conference of home
and colonial bishops, argued that ecclesiastical appeals
should be heard by a court staffed by bishops and
Archbishops. They further recommended that the
episcopal and archiepiscopal judges should be assisted by
six assessors, three lawyers and three theologians. No
further action resulted from these proposals.
An examination of ecclesiastical appeals between 1830
and 1873 thus makes three things clear. Firstly, the
composition of the Judicial Committee varied according to
the procedure or jurisdiction under which the suit was
brought. Church Discipline Act appeals would always be
heard by a panel including at least one bishop, but other
appeals might not be. Secondly, attempts to reform
ecclesiastical appeals generally formed part of a response to
episodes of ecclesiastical controversy. Those of the 1830s,
together with the Church Discipline Act 1840, were
prompted by high profile difficulties in enforcing standards
of clerical conduct and ministry. In the 1850s and 1860s
attention shifted to appeals in doctrinal suits in
consequence of several highly publicised prosecutions of
doctrinal heterodoxy. Finally, it can be seen that those
proposals for reform which were initiated by the High
Church tended both to increase the ecclesiastical or
episcopal element in the appeal court, and to impose limits
upon the role of legally trained judges in doctrinal cases.
THE ECCLESIASTICAL APPEALS QUESTION
AND THE SUPREME COURT OF
JUDICATURE BILL 1873
In the years immediately after 1867 there was a lull in
attempts to reform ecclesiastical appeals. There was, it
appeared, little prospect of securing either a change to the
composition of the Judicial Committee, or a transfer of
ecclesiastical jurisdiction to a new court. Lord Selborne’s
speech on introducing his Judicature Bill to the House of
Lords in 1873 gave no reason to suppose that this would
change. He explicitly stated that the Bill would in no way
touch ecclesiastical appeals. Yet the debates which
followed witnessed one of the most significant episodes in
the history of later nineteenth century attempts to reform
ecclesiastical jurisdiction, and demonstrated the potential
impact upon secular court reform of questions relating to
the ecclesiastical courts.
It was the actions of the prominent High Church and
Conservative peer Lord Salisbury which first indicated that
the detractors of the Judicial Committee would use the
Judicature Bill to secure change. Salisbury denounced the
failure to address the question of ecclesiastical appeals. He
proposed an amendment to the Bill which would have
transferred ecclesiastical appeals to the new (secular) court
of appeal. His amendment found some favour among
members of the House but was defeated following
objections by Archbishop Tait, who disliked the lack of
ecclesiastical expertise in the proposed court, and by Lord
Chancellor Selborne and Lord Cairns, who deemed the
amendment inexpedient.
A disgruntled but resigned Lord Salisbury accepted the
defeat of his amendment and the Bill proceeded to the
House of Commons without making any changes to
ecclesiastical appeals. Here, however, his amendment was
revived. This time it met with success. In the House of
Commons the proposal to transfer ecclesiastical appeals to
the new Court of Appeal came, not from a noted High
Churchman, but from the moderate Anglican and
Conservative MP Gathorne Hardy.
Hardy’s amendment was put forward in a sparsely
populated House during the committee stage of the Bill.
Despite the evident surprise of the Prime Minister, William18
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Gladstone, who commented on the very unusual degree of
agreement between MPs of all political and religious
persuasions, it met with almost universal approval. Given
this, and given the acknowledged problems with the
existing jurisdiction of the Judicial Committee, Gladstone
gave his support to the amendment. It passed without
division and the Bill was returned to the House of Lords in
a form which divested the Judicial Committee of its
ecclesiastical jurisdiction.
Upon the Bill’s return to the House of Lords it was plain
that Lord Selborne, who himself had no objection to the
transfer of jurisdiction, felt unable to withstand the weight
of the support behind Hardy’s amendment. Further, he
was convinced that the proposed change would be made at
some point in the future, even if it was not made in the
present Bill. He was himself convinced that the question
of ecclesiastical appeals would have to be addressed sooner
or later, and that another opportunity to secure reform
might not present itself in such a favourable form.
Though Selborne seemed happy with Hardy’s
amendment, and though it secured broad support in the
House of Lords, he was forced to contend with the
opposition of many of the bishops, including the
Archbishops. His solution was to propose an amendment
which conferred jurisdiction in ecclesiastical appeals upon
the new Court of Appeal, but which provided that when
that court heard such appeals it would be assisted by seven
episcopal assessors. This, he hoped, would provide the
appellate court with sufficient ecclesiastical expertise to
appease the Archbishops, but would do so without
compromising the legal character of the court, which was a
central concern of those who supported the transfer of
jurisdiction. Selborne’s amendment, though it failed to
appease the bishops, was grudgingly accepted by both
Houses.
THE SUPREME COURT OF JUDICATURE
ACT 1873 AND CONFUSION
SURROUNDING ECCLESIASTICAL APPEALS
The Judicature Act provided that the transfer of
ecclesiastical appeals to the new Court of Appeal would be
secured by Order in Council and undertaken at the
discretion of the Crown. Upon such a transfer being made
the Act determined that the Court of Appeal would be
assisted by seven episcopal assessors when it heard
ecclesiastical appeals. It also repealed section 16 of the
Church Discipline Act 1840. As such it secured one
uniform final court of appeal in all ecclesiastical cases, and
ensured that bishops would always be present at its
hearings, but only as assessors and never as judges.
Henceforth the court of final ecclesiastical appeal was to be
a purely legal one, but one which could have reference to
ecclesiastical assessors.
The Judicature Act 1873 did not, however, settle the
matter of ecclesiastical appeals, since reforms to
ecclesiastical jurisdiction became entangled in the
continued wrangles over secular appeals. The 1873 Act
left unresolved the question of secular appellate
jurisdiction in general, and the jurisdiction of the House of
Lords in particular. In consequence, its arrangements in
respect of ecclesiastical appeals were left in a state of limbo
until the passage of Lord Cairns’ Appellate Jurisdiction Act
in 1876 resolved matters. This Act stipulated that the
Judicial Committee of the Privy Council would retain its
jurisdiction over ecclesiastical appeals, but adopted the
1873 provisions in relation to the composition of the
court. The brief life of the Court of Appeal as an
ecclesiastical court was ended before it began.
REFLECTIONS UPON ECCLESIASTICAL
COURT REFORM IN PARLIAMENT
The perils and consequences of the parliamentary
process
The story of ecclesiastical appeals which has been
elaborated is a long and complicated one, but it is one
which has much to teach us. In the first place it
demonstrates both the shifting treatment of Church
questions in Parliament, and the unpredictability and
potential for havoc created by the Church of England’s
reliance upon Parliament in key areas. In 1873, after all,
ecclesiastical jurisdiction was transferred from the Judicial
Committee to the new Court of Appeal on the basis of an
amendment proposed by a private member in the House of
Commons. Parliament made this change in the teeth of
vehement opposition from the Archbishops and senior
bishops.
The manner in which the reform of ecclesiastical
jurisdiction was secured did not pass without comment.
Some parliamentarians complained about the failure to
consult the bishops on the proposed change, and about the
introduction of such profound reforms by a private
member rather than by the government. Many of the same
parliamentarians were also horrified that such weighty
ecclesiastical matters were dealt with in a secular Bill,
rather than by one dealing solely with ecclesiastical
matters.
None of these concerns, however, were sufficient to halt
the transfer of jurisdiction in 1873. The old conventions
regulating the treatment of Church questions in Parliament
had clearly changed. It was no longer expected that
Church legislation should always take the form of
government Bills. It was noted that it had been for some
years the practice for reforms to be promoted by private
members, particularly when they concerned the
ecclesiastical courts. Pragmatists also recognised the
increasing difficulty faced by the Church in securing
parliamentary time, and the unwillingness of the
government to put its weight behind ecclesiastical reforms
at a time when the Church was increasingly divided over
the questions at issue. They seized the opportunity offered 19
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by the Judicature Bill in 1873 both because they were
convinced that things would have to change, and because
they believed that no better opportunity for reform would
present itself.
The treatment which ecclesiastical appeals received at
the hands of Parliament between 1873 and 1875 was as
problematic as the manner in which the reforms were
introduced. That treatment starkly illustrated the perils
and pitfalls of the parliamentary process. In the first place,
only a miniscule amount of parliamentary time was
devoted to ecclesiastical appeals within the debates about
judicature reform. Further, Hardy’s amendment,
transferring ecclesiastical jurisdiction to the Court of
Appeal, was made upon only twenty-four hours notice. It
was passed without division by a sparsely populated House
of Commons after only scant debate. Equally worrying
was the fact that, though there was a general assumption
that the court would be staffed by lawyers, there was
almost no discussion of the staffing of the Court of Appeal
in ecclesiastical cases.
The treatment meted out to ecclesiastical appeals by the
House of Lords was no better, and provoked Archbishop
Tait into rebuking the House for treating matters of
profound importance to the Church in an “off-hand”
manner. Lord Selborne’s proposal that the Court of
Appeal should be assisted by a panel of episcopal assessors
was agreed after only a very short debate. Similarly, that
part of the Appellate Jurisdiction Act 1876 which
confirmed the ecclesiastical jurisdiction of the Judicial
Committee, and which determined its composition in line
with the proposals of 1873, was barely noted.
The relationship between secular and ecclesiastical
court reform
While it was evident that the parliamentary process
created problems with respect to reform, it was equally
obvious that the parliamentary context exercised a
profound influence over the shape which reforms took.
The most obvious consequence of this was the close
relationship between secular and ecclesiastical court
reform.
Within the context of the Judicature Act 1873 and the
Appellate Jurisdiction Act 1876 the relationship between
secular and ecclesiastical court reform was patent.
Reforms to both jurisdictions were undertaken in the same
piece of legislation. The relationship was, however, echoed
in less obvious ways in the content of the ecclesiastical
provisions of the Acts of 1873 and 1876, and in the
provisions of a separate attempt to reform ecclesiastical
jurisdiction by the Public Worship Regulation Act 1874.
Thus the provision for episcopal assessors in the court of
final ecclesiastical appeal echoed both arrangements in the
Judicial Committee Act 1833, which provided for the
attendance of two retired colonial judges at colonial
appeals in the Judicial Committee, and arrangements
enacted under the 1873 Act to ensure that the Court of
Appeal had access to professional expertise when
adjudicating appeals on certain matters. Similarly, the
Public Worship Regulation Act echoed the secular reforms
of 1873 by unifying the ecclesiastical courts (at least for the
purpose of causes brought under that Act) into a single
court of first instance with a single appeal to one appeal
court.
The fact that ecclesiastical jurisdiction was reformed by
Parliament, and within the context of reforms to the
secular legal system, shaped the arguments advanced for
ecclesiastical reform. In 1873 two of the most frequently
cited reasons for supporting the transfer of ecclesiastical
appeals to the new Court of Appeal were that the Bill
would weaken the Judicial Committee, (particularly as it
seemed likely at one point that that court would lose its
colonial jurisdiction), and that the Judicial Committee was
too expensive to maintain for the small number of cases it
actually heard. The arguments advanced generally reflected
the secular law reform agenda, speaking of the need for
legal expertise, a regularly constituted and adequately
staffed court, procedural efficiency, and a minimisation of
expense.
The absence of “church” arguments about ecclesiastical
appeals was a notable feature of the parliamentary debates
between 1873 and 1876. Arguments about the spiritual
authority of the ecclesiastical courts, which formed the
basis of almost all debates about ecclesiastical jurisdiction
at that time, were almost entirely absent. This was despite
the fact that many of those who spoke in Parliament had
published letters and pamphlets which advanced
arguments for reform based almost entirely upon different
attitudes towards the spiritual authority of the ecclesiastical
courts. Within Parliament it became evident that they
preferred to advance arguments which echoed assumptions
and considerations which were applicable to all courts,
whether secular or ecclesiastical. This was understandable
in the light of parliamentary reactions to those whose
speeches threatened to tow the Houses into the waters of
theological controversy and church history. The conduct
of such members was plainly unacceptable and they were
roundly rebuked for wasting parliamentary time.
What has been demonstrated so far is the clear impact
of the parliamentary context and secular law reform
agenda upon ecclesiastical reforms. It was equally clear,
however, that ecclesiastical reforms could potentially affect
secular court reform in Parliament. Both Selborne and
Cairns originally opposed the inclusion of ecclesiastical
appeals in the 1873 Bill precisely because they believed
that the Bill would fail if it attempted to address the
potentially divisive question of ecclesiastical appeals. Their
first priority was to secure reform to the secular courts and
they had do so with only limited parliamentary time, and
in a manner acceptable to a diverse array of professional
and political interests. While the 1873 Bill passed into law,
at least one MP was convinced that the failure of the 187420
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Bill, which would have amended it was directly attributable
to the excitement caused in Parliament by the Public
Worship Regulation Act of that year.
REFLECTIONS UPON THE COMPOSITION
OF THE FINAL COURT OF ECCLESIASTICAL
APPEAL UNDER THE 1873 AND 1876 ACTS
Turning away from a consideration of the influence of
the parliamentary context and process, a further, and
related, area of interest concerns the substance of the
reforms made in 1873 and 1876. This leads to a
consideration of attitudes towards the role of the episcopal
assessors, the relative merits of lawyers and bishops as
judges, and perceptions of what it was that the court of
final ecclesiastical appeal actually did.
As noted above, Lord Selborne’s provision for episcopal
assessors to assist the final court of ecclesiastical appeal
mirrored provisions made in respect of colonial appeals,
and also the concern that the new secular Court of Appeal
should have access to specialist medical and other
knowledge where that was appropriate. It was clear that he
saw the episcopal assessors as a means of ensuring that the
court had adequate access to ecclesiastical and theological
expertise without compromising its legal character and
composition. He hoped that this would meet the concerns
of the opponents of the transfer of jurisdiction, who were
concerned about lack of ecclesiastical expertise in the new
court, and the concerns of those who objected to the
mixed character of the Judicial Committee. In the years
that followed, however, the provision for episcopal
assessors was productive of more controversy than almost
any other aspect of ecclesiastical jurisdiction.
The correspondence and trial notebooks of Archbishop
Tait, Lord Cairns and Lord Selborne, demonstrated that
the episcopal assessors played a strictly defined and limited
role in respect of ecclesiastical appeals. Under the terms
of the 1873 and 1876 Acts they were only consulted at the
discretion of the court. After the hearing their role was
simply to review the wording of the court’s judgment to
ensure that it did not have any unforeseen theological
implications. Yet the common view, particularly amongst
High Churchmen and the High Church press, was that the
assessors played a dominant role in the formulation of the
court’s judgments.
Such views were foreshadowed in the debates of 1873
and 1876. In 1873 The Times likened Selborne’s proposals
to Bishop Blomfield’s failed Bill of 1850, which would have
referred all doctrinal suits to a panel of bishops for their
opinion. It felt that that the real effect of the provision was
to exclude legal influence in favour of a tyrannical spiritual
influence. Similarly, in debates on the 1876 Act, the MP
Beresford Hope, a High Churchman, argued that:
“The name and pretence of their being only ‘assessors’ would
deceive no one. They were meant to be Judges, and only
more influential Judges because not having countable votes
they would exercise illicit influence. They would be to the real
Court what a masterful wife was to her husband.”
These assumptions about the role which the episcopal
assessors played in ecclesiastical appeals raised questions
relating to perceptions of the relative merits of bishops and
lawyers as ecclesiastical judges. It was plainly important to
those who sought the transfer of jurisdiction that the court
should be staffed only by legally trained judges. By
relegating the bishops to the role of assessors Selborne
sought to achieve this, but why was it so important? An
answer to this question was found in the contrasting
characterisation of lawyers and bishops. Lord Salisbury, for
example, enunciated a widely held opinion when he told
the House of Lords in 1873 that:
“He did not desire to throw the shadow of a reflection on the
Members of the Episcopal Bench… but if they were impartial
it was a special merit, Bishops being the least likely persons to
carry impartiality into questions deeply interesting them.
They were likely to have pledged themselves at some period of
their career to one side or the other; they had probably
expressed opinions more or less strong on particular subjects,
and they had none of that freedom from interest or prejudice
which we are proud to recognise in the Judges of the land.
They could not in the nature of the case be the most impartial
tribunal, and they certainly were not educated for law.”
In contrast to a portrayal of bishops as incompetent to
decide matters of law, and subject to bias, lawyers were
portrayed as paragons of impartiality and reason. As Dr
Ball MP (a lawyer) put it:
“[A] thoroughly practiced lawyer had no feeling at all, any
more than he had about problems he was working out.”
On one level assumptions about the character and
capabilities of bishops could be explained as a reflection of
the social, political and religious context of those who
enunciated them. They reflected common beliefs
regarding both the detrimental effect of religious
enthusiasm upon reason and intellect, and the skills and
abilities of the clergy. In a sense, too, the bishops were
experiencing the consequences of attempts both to
professionalise the clergy, and to enhance their identity as
distinct from the laity and possessed of special qualities.
On another level, attitudes towards the bishops reflected
assumptions about what it was that the court of final
ecclesiastical appeal should be doing. The general tenor of
the debates was that a court in which the bishops played a
significant role was doing something more than just law.
This, it was argued, was improper. In a court which should
have been deciding law it was improper and inexpedient to
have episcopal judges, who were neither trained nor fitted
to the task.
The next question was why it was so important to the
supporters of the Hardy’s amendment that the court of
final ecclesiastical appeal should be seen as doing only law.
One answer was that both the new Court of Appeal and the 21
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Judicial Committee had received ecclesiastical jurisdiction
by virtue of an Act of Parliament. At a time when certain
elements within the Church were asserting its authority,
autonomy, and identity as a spiritual body it was potentially
disastrous for a court constituted under statute to appear
to decide the theology or ecclesiastical policy of the
Church. Indeed the Judicial Committee had always been
careful to emphasise that what it decided was the law, and
not the soundness or orthodoxy of any particular doctrine.
Another, related, explanation was that, at a time when
the Church was increasingly divided by theological
differences and controversies, the law applied by a court
staffed by lawyers was widely viewed as the only possible
hope of maintaining a doctrinally broad and
comprehensive Church which was capable of fulfilling a
national mission. The Church’s formularies had
established a legal ring-fence within which a range of
doctrinal positions were acceptable. This was endangered
by the role of ecclesiastics in ecclesiastical appeals since
their natural tendency was to propound their own
theological views as the truth, and to persecute those who
differed from them.
Even if they could be trusted not to engage in doctrinal
witch-hunts, and even if some theological expertise was
required, their opponents argued that the bishops were not
qualified to act as either judges or assessors. Not only did
they lack legal training or attributes, but there was no
guarantee that they were learned in theology or
representative of the Church. Neither of these qualities
were, their detractors argued, significant in the decision-
making processes of those who appointed them.
Despite these explanations there remained one
conundrum to be resolved, namely, why in 1873 and 1876
High Churchmen in particular supported the transfer of
ecclesiastical appeals to a court staffed exclusively by
lawyers; and why many of them opposed the role of
episcopal assessors. This was, after all, a volte face in respect
of previous High Church reform initiatives, all of which
would have strengthened the ecclesiastical element of the
final court to the detriment of the legal element.
Moreover, by the time the Royal Commission of
Ecclesiastical Courts took evidence in 1883 it was apparent
that many High Churchmen had lost their faith in lawyers
and were once again advocating a final court of appeal
staffed only by ecclesiastics.
The conduct of High Church supporters of the reform
were equally puzzling when considered in light of their
usual attitudes towards Church questions and reform.
They had previously lambasted the Judicial Committee for
its failure to condemn heterodox doctrine, indicating that
they had little sympathy with its role in the legal protection
of a range of doctrinal positions. Further, of all sections
within the Church they probably had the most advanced
confessions for the Church as a confessional body defined
by reference to strict standards. As such, they had, at first
glance, little cause to be sympathetic to the idea that legally
trained judges would maintain the breadth of the Church
and thus ensure that it was fitted to its role as a national
and Established body.
One possible explanation for High Church support for
a purely legal court was their antipathy towards the current
occupiers of the episcopal bench. The practices of the
more extreme element of the High Church had found little
favour with the bishops of the time and relationships were
often strained. Another explanation was that by 1873 the
ecclesiastical appeals being heard by the Judicial
Committee were almost entirely concerned with High
Church practices and the extreme High Church was
dissatisfied with its treatment at the hands of the mixed
Judicial Committee. Given this, and given the opposition
of the bishops, perhaps they decided that they were better
off with a court of appeal which would concern itself only
with questions of law. In effect, they would trust to lawyers
to maintain the legal ring-fence of the formularies which
would, it was hoped, safeguard their practices and protect
them from ecclesiastical persecution.
Several prominent people, including Archbishop Tait,
advanced another reason, arguing that the proposed
transfer of jurisdiction to the new Court of Appeal was part
of a High Church conspiracy. Some conspiracy theorists
contended that the reason Selborne’s amendment was
supported was that it would secure what Blomfield had
wanted, namely reference of all doctrinal suits to a panel of
bishops for their opinion, which would in effect bind the
hands of the court. Given the High Church’s distrust of
the bishops this was unlikely.
However, other conspiracy theorists argued that what
the High Church wanted was to secure the transfer of
ecclesiastical jurisdiction to a court which, since it was
created by Parliament without reference to Convocations,
and since (in the original conception) it had no
ecclesiastical personnel, would lack the spiritual authority
which the High Church deemed necessary to bind their
consciences in spiritual matters. In other words they
sought a justification for disobedience to the judgments of
the final court of ecclesiastical appeal. Given the future
conduct of High Church defendants, this was an entirely
plausible explanation of their role in the passage of the
1873 and 1876 Acts.
CONCLUSION
Our history of ecclesiastical appeals and their place in
the history of the reforms introduced by the Judicature Act
1873 has ended with allegations of skulduggery and
intrigue. It is hoped, however, that it has served to
illustrate two things. Firstly, it demonstrates the
significance of the parliamentary context and process in
shaping attempts to reform ecclesiastical jurisdiction. This
context fundamentally affected the arguments advanced,
and created a nexus between ecclesiastical and secular22
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court reform which had a profound impact upon the
reforms advanced. The fact that ecclesiastical and secular
law reform intersected in Parliament also meant that the
fate of secular reforms could be affected by ecclesiastical
controversies. Secondly, though, this history shows that
proposals for ecclesiastical court reform were strongly
influenced by the religious sympathies and assumptions of
the protagonists. It is upon this aspect of the history of
ecclesiastical appeals that attention is most often focussed;
but it is hoped that this article has demonstrated that it
cannot be fully understood without reference to the legal
and political context in which reforms took place.
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